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ULL-DUPLEX radio which can receive and transmit at the same time and same frequency has received much attention in recent years. There are many works focusing on how to reduce the amount of self-interference on a full-duplex radio and how to implement prototypes of full-duplex radio, e.g., see [1] - [6] . There are also many works on how to utilize full-duplex radio for improved network capacity, e.g., see [7] - [11] .
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Fig.
1. An illustration of wireless network of legitimate users (such as drones) all with full-duplex capability but subject to passive eavesdropping from unknown locations.
ers or in antenna beamspace. A common assumption in all these works is that the legitimate users have the full knowledge of the large-scale fading of their channels with respect to eavesdroppers (Eves). Furthermore, all these works assume that Eves have the full knowledge of both the large-scale and small-scale fading of their channels with respect to the legitimate users. This paper studies the application of full-duplex radio for securing wireless network from a perspective that is unique from all of the above mentioned prior works. It focuses on a wireless network of legitimate users all equipped with full-duplex radio, subject to eavesdropping from arbitrary locations as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The paper first shows an analysis of the secrecy capacity of two single-antenna users against an arbitrarily located multi-antenna Eve (which could represent a network of colluding Eves) that has the full knowledge of its channel state information (CSI) with respect to the users. (In this paper, "user", "legitimate user" and "full-duplex radio" are interchangeable.) Two cases of how Eve processes their received signals are considered: one is a basic matched-filtering (BMF), and the other is the optimal matched-filtering (OMF). For BMF, it is shown that the probability of zero secrecy (outage) of the two users against the multi-antenna Eve can be always made small by a large jamming power from the two users and a small power gain of the residual self-interference (RSI) channel. But for OMF, it is shown that the probability of outage of the two users grows rapidly as either the number of the antennas on the Eve increases or the jamming power from the two users increases.
With the above important insight, a novel method for antieavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) is also proposed in this paper. This method allows both users to estimate their own CSI with respect to each other but at the same time prevents any Eves from obtaining their CSI with respect to the users. It is shown that any Eve without its CSI can be made virtually blind and deaf to the secret information transmitted between the users. This ANECE method is also extended in this paper to the cases of two multi-antenna users, multiple multi-antenna users as well as broadband multiple multi-antenna users. The ANECE method does not require the users to have any knowledge of the CSI at the Eves except for a minor constraint shown later. The proposed method for ANECE differs substantially from those in [41] and [42] . In [41] , a recursive training scheme was proposed where each recursion involves a feedback from Bob to Alice. In [42] , assuming the reciprocal property of the channel between Alice and Bob, it was suggested that Alice simply avoids transmitting any pilot but relies on Bob transmitting a pilot. None of these prior methods prevents Eve from obtaining its CSI with respect to Bob. Furthermore, the proposed method for ANECE in case of multiple users allow all users to obtain their mutual CSI while preventing Eves from obtaining their CSI with respect to any of the users.
The basic assumptions made in this paper are the following A1-A4: A1: The circuitry for self-interference cancellation in each full-duplex radio is already built-in, and there still exists an amount of RSI, the power of which is proportional to the power of the original source of the self-interference. But the RSI waveform is virtually white and its shape is independent of the original self-interference waveform. The RSI is mainly caused by noises (such as thermal noises) in circuitry and hence tends to be white especially if the optimal cancellation scheme is used. This model is based on the prior experiences in selfinterference cancellation for full-duplex radio [4] - [6] where both theory and hardware implementations are available. The above modelling of the RSI channel can also be explained as follows. Let s 1 (t) + n 1 (t) be the signal plus noise at the input of the original self-interference channel (including all components applied for interference isolation) with the signal-to-noise ratio SNR 1 =
, and s 2 (t) + n 2 (t) be the signal plus noise at the output of the original channel with SNR 2 = S 2 N 2 . Note that s 1 (t) and s 2 (t) may be perfectly correlated but n 1 (t) and n 2 (t) are independent and white. The noise factor of the original channel is defined as K = SNR 1 SNR 2 > 1. Assuming an optimal self-interference cancellation, the RSI would be a combination of n 1 (t) and n 2 (t), and is typically dominated by n 2 (t). The power of n 2 (t) is N 2 = K S 2 SNR 1 where S 2 is typically proportional to S 1 . For example, if SNR 1 = 60 dB, K = 5 dB and
= −115 dB. A2: All Eves are passive, i.e., they do not transmit. For statistical analysis of secrecy capacity, the small-scale fading from users to Eves is assumed to have an amplitude-wise Rayleigh distribution from the users' perspective. Some results of the analysis do not either require the users to know the large-scale fading from users to Eves. For ANECE, no knowledge of the CSI from users to Eves is required by the users.
A3: All noises are white Gaussian. All users are equally capable. This assumption is made for simple exposure of key ideas although some extension from this assumption can be straightforward.
A4: All antennas are omnidirectional within angles of interest unless mentioned otherwise.
The results shown in this paper may or may not require noncollusion among Eves, which will be made clear in the context. The potential applications of these results include in particular mobile ad hoc wireless network (such as drone network) where all nodes are capable of full-duplex at a common frequency. It is also important to mention that this paper focuses on transmission of secret information between users who do not share pre-existing secret information. If there is any pre-existing secret information shared by the users, they can communicate with each other securely (without full-duplex) by following the conventional methods such as cryptography at the network layer [24] . Any existing secret shared among users could be also used by the users at the physical layer (e.g., as a seed of a pseudorandom sequence) to generate such an artificial noise that interferes Eves but is removable by legitimate receivers. The use of artificial noise in beamspace is not considered in this paper.
In Section II, the secrecy capacity of two single-antenna users against an arbitrarily located multi-antenna Eve is analysed. Some of the results are a generalization of some shown in [25] where an arbitrarily located single-antenna Eve was focused on. In Section III, the proposed ANECE method is presented for a two-user case and a multi-user case. The extensions of ANECE for two multi-antenna users, multiple multi-antenna users and multiple broadband multi-antenna users are given in the appendix.
The key novelty of this paper includes: novel insights into the performance of single-antenna full-duplex radio users against multi-antenna Eves with knowledge of their CSI, novel method for ANECE in various settings; and novel understanding of the secrecy capacity between users against Eves without knowledge of their CSI.
The notations: All vector variables are in bold lower case. All matrix variables are in bold upper case. The expectation is E{·}. The magnitude of a scalar or the determinant of a matrix is | · |. The norm of a vector is · . The complex Gaussian distribution of zero mean and covariance R is CN (0, R). The M × M identity matrix is I M . The set of all n × m complex matrices is C n ×m . All other notations are defined in the context.
II. PROPERTIES OF SECRECY CAPACITY AGAINST EVES WITH CSI
In this section, the focus is on the exchange of secret information between two users (Alice and Bob) each with a single antenna and a full-duplex capability. ("secret information", "secret key" and "key" are interchangeable in this paper.) The users are subject to eavesdropping by a multi-antenna Eve at arbitrary location. Such a multi-antenna Eve could represent a network of distributed colluding Eves.
Without loss of generality, let the normalized locations of Alice and Bob be (−0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0) respectively, and that of an arbitrary Eve be (x E , y E ). (The 3-D case can be similarly treated.) Note that all location coordinates, channel gains and noise variances shown in this paper are normalized in a similar way as in [25] . The channel gain between Alice and Bob is denoted by h. Consider an exchange of keys between Alice and Bob in two phases. In phase 1, Alice sends a key to Bob, and in phase 2, Bob sends a (different) key to Alice. The two phases can be either in two time slots or in two frequency bands. But in either case, assume that all channel amplitudes are invariant from phase 1 to phase 2.
In phase 1, Bob receives
and an Eve receives
, k is the time index, √ P T x A (k) of power P T is the signal transmitted by Alice, √ P J v B (k) of power P J is the jamming noise from Bob, √ ρP J g B w B (k) of power ρP J is the RSI noise at Bob after self-interference cancellation, n B is the background noise at Bob, and n A,E is the background noise vector at Eve. All noises are assumed to be white Gaussian.
Then, the SNR at Bob is
The effective SNR at Eve depends on how Eve processes y A,E (k). If Eve knows h A , then it can perform a BMF to y A,E (k) as follows:
In this case, the effective SNR at Eve is
(5) On the other hand, if Eve knows h A , h B , b and P J , then Eve could use the following OMF on y A,E (k) (which is noise whitening followed by matched-filtering):
where R A,E is the covariance matrix of the noise terms in y A,E (k) and
Then, the effective SNR at Eve is
It is known that SN R A,E ,b ≤ SN R A,E ,o with equality if R A,E is proportional to the identity matrix, and the OMF leads to the optimal detection at Eve.
In phase 2, Alice receives
and Eve receives
where the notations are similarly defined as before. Note that n B ,E (k) and n A,E (k) are independent. For convenience, a symmetry between Alice and Bob in terms of P T , P J and the distributions of noises has been assumed. It follows that the SNR at Alice is
The effective SNR at Eve based on the BMF is
where Eve requires the knowledge of h B . And the effective SNR at Eve based on the OMF is
where Eve requires the knowledge of h A , h B , a and P J . Assuming no collusion between Eves, the averaged secrecy capacity in bits/s/Hz against any given Eve is 
+ = max(x, 0). Important properties of the secrecy capacity shown in (14)-(16) will be discussed next. Some of these properties based on the BMF resemble the case of single-antenna Eves shown in [25] . It is useful to also focus on S A,B , from which one can infer the properties of S B ,A in an obvious way.
A. Properties of S A,B Based on BMF
S A,B is the secrecy capacity of the transmission from Alice to Bob against any given non-colluding Eve. The position and/or CSI of this Eve affects S A,B . It is also important to realize that the minimum of S A,B over all possible locations and/or channel gains of Eves subject to any known constraint on Eves defines the overall secrecy capacity of the transmission from Alice to Bob against all non-colluding Eves. That minimum is also the overall secrecy capacity against all Eves that could only collude at the network layer.
For some applications such as wireless communications between drones high in air and away from buildings, there can be virtually no multi-path between them and hence virtually no small scale fading. In this case, the elements of h A and h B are all constants. So, the properties of S A,B even in the absence of small-scale fading are useful.
One can verify that a generalization of Property 1 in [25] is the following: 
This property suggests that for a given pair ofâ andb, there are typically a turning point forρ and a turning point for P J in order to achieve a positive secrecy. In the absence of small-scale fading, bothâ andb are constants.
A restatement of the above property is the following, which is also a generalization of Property 2 in [25] , Property 2:
As illustrated by Fig. 2 
withβ =âb
2) For Eve in region R 2 , P J,opt is given by (17) but is strictly positive. 3) For Eve in region R 3 , P J,opt = 0. A useful insight from this property is that for any given a andb, asρ decreases and P T increases, P J,opt becomes
Now consider the impact of small-scale fading on the secrecy capacity S A,B . Bothâ andb depend not only on a and b but also on the small-scale fading of the channels of Eve. For multi-path rich environment, it is a good assumption that h A ∈ C M ×1 and h B ∈ C M ×1 are independent and each has the distribution CN (0, I). Then, it follows that that 2X A . = 2 h A 2 and 2X B . = 2 h B 2 are independent and each has the probability density function (PDF) of the standard Chi-squared random variable of 2M degrees of freedom, i.e., 
It is obvious that
are independent of X A and X B , respectively, and
Referring to (3) and (5), it follows that S
where
. Both v 1 and v 2 are invariant to the small-scale fading of Eves. But they are functions of a, b and the CSI of Alice and Bob. It follows that the probability of S A,B = 0, conditional on v 1 and v 2 , is
Since v 1 is proportional to b a and v 2 is proportional to
e., the secrecy is the worst against the Eve that is the closest to Alice on her opposite side from Bob. Also, as a increases, both v 1 and v 2 approach zero and hence P(S A,B = 0|v 1 , v 2 ) approaches one.
An alternative form of P(S A,B = 0|v 1 , v 2 ) can be shown by switching the order of the two integrals in (19) to be
Γ(p) = 1 for any given z. Therefore, one has: Property 4:
for any given v 1 and v 2 .
To see an asymptotical dependence of P(S A,B = 0|v 1 , v 2 ) on M , one can verify the following:
Property 5:
The above two properties show how detrimental it is to Alice and Bob if Eve has multiple antennas.
One could also discuss the properties of S A,B based on the OMF. But it is obvious that the use of OMF at Eve must make S A,B even worse than those shown above. So, those properties are omitted. The next section discusses the properties of S that results from dual transmissions.
B. Properties of S Based on BMF
It is obvious that S = 0 iff S A,B ≤ 0 and S B ,A ≤ 0, or equivalently iff SN R A,B ≤ SN R A,E and SN R B ,A ≤ SN R B ,E . Related to Part 3) of Property 10 in [25] is:
Property 6: There is a
Proof: The above follows from the application of Parts 1 and 2 of Property 2 to the two components in S.
This property covers the important and typical situation where Eve is not far away from Alice and Bob. And it shows how in this situation the required ρ is affected by all the parameters of the CSI in a deterministic fashion. For example, one can see that the required ρ is small if the two vectors h A and h B are nearly orthogonal, and/or the norms of the two vectors are large (all of which tend to be true when M is large).
Next, the properties of S subject to random h A and h B are discussed. One can verify that S = 0 iff
It is useful to examine p 0 subject to fixed ρ, P J , |h| 2 , |g A | 2 and |g B | 2 but random X A , X B and Φ. Note that the first set of parameters are known to Alice and Bob while the second set of parameters are random unknowns.
Under the assumption that h A and h B are independent CN (0, I), it is known that X A , X B and Φ are independent. It is also known that 2X A and 2X B are the standard Chi-squared random variables each with degree 2M , which can be used to derive the PDF of T b . But the distribution of Φ does not seem readily available in the literature except for the case of two realvalued vectors [26] . To see useful properties of S, one needs to understand the PDFs of T b and Φ as discussed next.
Property 7: Let
For 0 < t < t * , the PDF of
is the unit step function. (The step function will not be used when it is obvious that the variable must be positive.
is generally nonzero, but becomes negligible if P J becomes large. The explicit expression of f T b (t) for t < 0 is omitted due to its unimportance.
Proof:
One can verify that the two linear inequalities in the last expression can possibly hold simultaneously iff t < t * . In other words, if t ≥ t * , F T b (t) = 1. Subject to 0 < t < t * , one can verify that
where the upper and lower limits of the inner integral over y are equal when x in the outer integral equals its lower limit.
(where one of the three terms in the derivative is zero). It is obvious from (25) that T b can be negative. But as P J increases, c 2 and c 4 become negligible, so does the probability of T b < 0, and hence so does f T b (t) for t < 0.
For M > 1, it seems hard to reduce (28) even if possible.
and one can verify after some tedious manipulations that (28) reduces to
For a large P J , the self-interferences at both Alice and Bob dominate the background noise, i.e., ρ|g B | 2 P J 1 and ρ|g A | 2 P J 1, and hence t * converges to its lower bound
which is proportional to ρ and invariant to P J . It is useful to know the mean of T b under large P J . Assume a large P J for which c 2 and c 4 go to zero. In this case, (28) becomes
. Furthermore, one can show that the expectation of T b is
where the change of variable
x has been applied to obtain the second term for the second equation. Note that 
where 
and B(x; a, b)
It is known from the discussion of the equation (3.15) in [27] that lim M →∞ I(r; M + 1, M − 1) = 0 for a fixed r < Property 8:
The PDF of Φ (the squared-cosine-magnitude of the angle between two complex Gaussian vectors) as defined in (24) is given by With the knowledge of the PDFs of T b and Φ, one can evaluate the probability p 0 of zero secrecy by
This expression can be used to compute p 0 under any ρ, P J , |h| 2 , |g A | 2 and |g B | 2 . A special case of the above is as follows: Property 9: If P J is large and ρ is small so that t * 1, and M ≥ 2, then
and for a large M ,
This property says that with a large P J , one can always keep p 0 small by keeping (M − 1)ρ small. It is also important to note that the upper bound on p 0 shown in (39) is invariant to any CSI of Eves. The result of (40) implies that for large M , large P J and small ρ, the most harmful Eve is at a location where a = b , i.e.,
, such a location is at the half-way between Alice and Bob. (Although p 0 here is constant for all Eves on the y-axis, the secrecy capacity S increases as Eve moves away along the y-axis from the origin.)
For the special case of M = 1, it is known that Φ = 1, i.e., f Φ (x) = δ(x − 1).
Property 10: For M = 1,
where f T b (t) is given by (31) . Here, p 0 is zero iff t * ≤ 1. Note that for M = 1, one can keep p 0 = 0 exactly by keeping t * ≤ 1. But for M > 1, it is unavoidable to have p 0 > 0 although one can make p 0 small by having a small ρ(M − 1). The above properties have shown something rather encouraging in terms of the secrecy capacity of two single-antenna users against multi-antenna Eves. In other words, provided that P J is large enough and ρ is small enough, one can keep p 0 small. This motivates us to look into S based on the OMF at Eve, as shown next.
C. Properties of S Based on OMF
Now consider S defined in (14) - (16) 
where Z A,B = (
. Obviously, there is a nonzero probability for T o < 0.
Property 11: Let F T o (t) be the CDF of T o , and f T o (t) be the PDF of T o . Then,
where f Φ (x) is given by (37) , and F T o (t) for t < 1 is given by (49). Furthermore, P{T o > 1} > 0 iff t * > 1 where t * is defined in (27) .
Proof: In the following, both the proof and a discussion are provided. The CDF of T o is
where T o > t is equivalent to
Assume t < 1. Then, the first inequality in (45) implies
a (1−t) . The second inequality in (45) implies that
for all X A ≥ 0. The above conditions are illustrated in Fig. 2 . Let (x * , y * ) be two positive numbers such that (45) hold with inequalities replaced by equalities and (X A , X B ) = (x * , y * ). Namely, x * is the positive solution to a (1−t) . Therefore, for t < 1,
Note that x * is also function of t. The PDF f T o (t) of T o can be found from
∂ ∂ t F T o (t).
But the result is too tedious to be insightful and hence omitted. Given F T o (t), one can compute P{S = 0} according to (43) . Now consider t = 1. In this case, the two nonlinear terms in (45) vanish, which results in two linear inequalities. Furthermore, one can verify that both conditions in (45) can be satisfied at the same time with a nonzero probability iff t
When t > 1, the first condition in (45) 
and
Proof: Here, (53) follows from (42) and the fact that c 0 , c A and c B all decrease towards zero in the order of O( Since the mean of Φ is 1 M , the probability of zero secrecy P{Φ ≤ T o } based on the OMF at a multi-antenna Eve is generally high for any P J . One can verify that if
Note that for the OMF, Eve needs to know the complete CSI: h A , h B , a, b and P J . One can further investigate the sensitivity of the secrecy capacity to the errors in the knowledge of the CSI. It is obvious from R
−1
A,E and R
B ,E (e.g., see (7)) that the above results are not sensitive to the errors in the knowledge of a, b and P J provided that P J is large or M is large. But the knowledge of h A and h B is essential for eavesdropping. This motivates the next section on ANECE.
III. ANECE
The insights shown in the previous section motivate the need of ANECE, for which a novel method is presented next.
A. Two-User Case
Let both Alice and Bob transmit their channel-estimation pilots simultaneously. (Such pilots cannot be secrets in general especially if they are standardized and hence accessible by third parties.) And they receive the following signals, respectively,
is the RSI noise at Alice, √ ρP T g B w B (k) is that at Bob, and n A (k) and n B (k) are the background noises.
As discussed before, it is reasonable to assume that w A (k), w B (k), n A (k) and n B (k) are mutually independent, white, and have zero means and unit variances. Note that no assumption on the shapes of p A (k) and p B (k) has been made yet.
Alice is interested in the two unknowns: h and |g A |, both of which are generally affected by the surrounding multipath. The two pilots (i.e., p A (k) = p B (k)) are used for channel estimation by both Alice and Bob at the same time, and the two payloads (i.e., x A (k) and x B (k)) contain secret information. Eve also knows the pilots but is unable to estimate its CSI (e.g., see (58) with p A (k) = p B (k)). Obviously, when equipped with ideal or near-ideal full-duplex radios, the users would not need to schedule their payloads orthogonally in time, which hence further inhibits eavesdropping.
. Also,ĥ is unbiased and has the variance:
The MLE of h and |g A | are consistent as long as p B 2 increases with K. The simplest choice of p B (k) is such that |p B (k)| = 1 for all k = 1, . . . , K, for which p B 2 = K. In practice, ρ and K should be such that var{ĥ} is small enough. Obviously, for a given required var{ĥ}, the smaller is ρ, the smaller is the value of K that one can allow. At the same time as Alice performs the above estimation, Bob can perform a similar consistent estimation of h and |g B | based on y B (k) and p A (k) = 1 for all k = 1, . . . , K. Now let us consider the signal received by Eve, which is Note that if the reciprocal property of the channel between Alice and Bob holds, once Alice and Bob have found h, they already have some level of shared secret information unknown to Eve. Due to noise, any estimate of h needs to be quantized at Alice and Bob (although separately) according to a pre-determined scheme in order for them to obtain the same quantized estimate of h with high probability. The amount of secret bits shared by Alice and Bob after the estimation of h is upper bounded by the mutual information between y A (k) and y B (k). Such an analysis is available in [39] .
In mobile applications, channel estimation pilot is in general an integral part of a data packet. This is because CSI varies significantly from one packet to the next due to mobility. The change of CSI is also often caused by imperfections of circuits (including carrier frequency offset). An example of a simplified packet structure based on the above channel estimation method is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
Let us revisit (2) with P J = 0 but for Eves without the knowledge of their CSI with respect to Alice and Bob, i.e.,
where h A is unknown and k = 1, . . . , K. In order for Eve to obtain any information from Alice, Eve now has to do blind estimation of x A (k). However, with unknown h A , the sequence {x A (k)} is not identifiable from the sequence {y A,E (k)} due to a complex scalar ambiguity [35] - [37] . For security against eavesdropping, the ambiguity of the blind problem should be maximally exploited to degrade the capacity of Eve. It is shown in Appendix B that the capacity of Eve without CSI to receive information from a transmitter can be degraded severely by some coding scheme used at the transmitter. Property 13: With the proposed two-user channel estimation method in an environment where the CSI of Eves is previously unknown to them, the secrecy capacity of the two users against all Eves over a short time interval can be made close to the channel capacity between the users.
With a single antenna on each user, the short time interval corresponds to a single sample 2 (or two samples) if the payloads are scheduled orthogonally (or concurrently). To increase the amount of secret information, the users could increase their transmission power (or use a repetition code). Alternatively, both users could use smart antennas to change their CSI for each of several new cycles of channel estimation and secret key transmissions. Obviously, to precisely quantify the overall secrecy capacity, one also needs to take into account the overhead of channel estimation.
If Eve knows the large-scale fading of its CSI with respect to Alice and Bob (i.e., a and b) and also knows a reliable statistical model of h A and h B , then Eve can try to estimate h A and h B based on y E (k) received during training or based on an estimate of h E .
Such an example is shown in Appendix C. But in practice, the statistical model of a channel at an arbitrary location is very difficult to establish accurately.
With a partial knowledge of h A , for example, there is in theory a positive capacity C A,E from Alice to Eve. Assuming one sample per coherent period of h A , a lower bound and an upper bound of C A,E can be translated from equations (61) and (62) in [40] respectively. The lower bound diminishes to zero if the mean of h A is much smaller than its variance, and the upper bound corresponds to the case where h A is completely known to Eve.
On the other hand, if K in (59) is large (i.e., a large number of samples per coherent period of h A ), then the averaged capacity from Alice to Eve without knowledge of h A could in theory approach the capacity from Alice to Eve with knowledge of h A . This is because the amount of ambiguity associated with an unknown scalar becomes negligible when compared to the total amount of information carried by x A (k) for large K. One can verify this by reconsidering (88) in Appendix B. For example, if M A = M E = 1, and x(k) is i.i.d. and has constant modulus, then the equality in (88) holds (since Hx(k) is now Gaussian distributed), and the second term in (88) diminishes to zero as K increases, which leads to C A,E = log 2 (1 + σ 2 x σ 2 h ). But it is important to note that this capacity is achievable only if there is a joint coding (between Alice and Eve) over many of such large independent blocks (each corresponding to an independent realization of H). Blind detection is not a trivial problem as shown in [37] where a single block is considered, and no method can resolve the ambiguity inherent in the problem unless there is additional side information.
Once the secret keys have been shared between the users, they could switch back to conventional modes of communications and still maintain secrecy through network-layer cryptography. The frequency band used for the key exchange can also be different from that for normal communications, and hence the required full-duplex radio can be implemented in any frequency band.
In Appendix D, an extension of the above channel estimation method to the case of multi-input multiple-output (MIMO) user channels is presented.
B. Multi-User Case
This section considers a multi-user problem where multiple (N ≥ 3) full-duplex single-antenna users want to share their secret keys with each other. If the number of users is large and multi-hop transmissions are necessary, the problem is complex and needs to be treated separately. Related works on this subject include [30] - [33] . But the focus here is on a single-hop multi-user wireless network, where every user is within a single transmission range of any other user.
Extending the channel estimation method presented in the previous section, there are now N users transmitting their packets simultaneously. The packet from the ith user consists of a pilot p i (k) and a payload x i (k) where i = 1, . . . , N. At the same time that user i transmits p i (k) and x i (k), user i also receives
in the pilot region, and
in the payload region. Here, h j,i is the CSI (including both large-scale and small-scale fading) from user j to user i, and all other notations are obviously defined. Also at the same time, the signals received by any Eve with M antennas can be expressed as
in the payload region.
To simplify the notations, one can stack all y i (k), k = 1, . . . , K, vertically into a column vector y i , and all y E (k), k = 1, . . . , K, horizontally into a matrix Y E , and rewrite (60) and (62) as
where P = [p 1 , . . . , p N ] is the K × N pilot matrix shared by all users, the ith column of which is the pilot sent from user i (i.e.,
is P with its ith column removed, h i of (N − 1) × 1 is the CSI vector of user i with respect to all other users, and the jth column of the M × N matrix H E is the CSI vector h j,E of Eve with respect to user j. In order for all users to be able to identify their CSI locally, it is necessary and sufficient that each P i has the fullcolumn rank N − 1. In order to make Eve unable to identify its CSI, it is necessary and sufficient that P (of N columns) has a rank no larger than N − 1.
An ideal choice of P is as follows. Let K = k 0 (N − 1) where k 0 is an integer and P is
where the (m, l)th element of the
(j is also used elsewhere as an integer which should be clear in the context.) It is easy to verify that the rank of P is N − 1; every column of P has the same norm √ K = k 0 (N − 1); and the normalized inner product between the ith and lth (distinct) columns of P is
the magnitude of which is the same for all pairs of the columns of P. In a sense, all columns of P are equally spaced from each other in a (N − 1)-dimensional subspace. This is why the above P is considered to be ideal. The MLE of h i from y i at user i iŝ
with m i,l being an integer dependent on i = 1, . . . , N and l = 1, . . . , N − 1. It follows that and hence the computation forĥ i is very simple. The estimateĥ i is unbiased and has the covariance matrix does not include h 0 , then H E would be identifiable. But for a random H E , that assumption holds with probability zero.
It should be noted that the above discussion assumes that Eve has no statistical knowledge of H E , which is often the case in practice especially if Eve does not know its large-scale fading with respect to the users. Otherwise, if an Eve knows the statistics of H E , the linear minimum mean squared error (LMMSE) estimation of it, for example, can be easily applied, and there is a nonzero capacity from any of the users to the Eve although this capacity can be degraded greatly by the uncertainty of H E .
If the payloads x i (l) from all users are not overlapping in time, one can write from (61) that
where i = j, l j is the time index where x j (l j ) = 0 (but x m (l j ) = 0 with m = j). Also note that w i (l j ) = 0 due to x i (l j ) = 0. The secrecy capacity from user j to user i against any Eve who does not know h j,E can be made relatively close to log 2 (1 + P T |h j,i | 2 ) subject to a high power and a short period of time as in the two-users case. This choice of non-overlapping payloads is effective for each user to broadcast a secret key to all other users. An example of the packet structure is shown in Fig. 5 .
With the multi-user channel estimation method shown above, each user obtains its CSI with respect to all other users. With the reciprocal property, the CSI obtained by each user is the CSI of both to and from all other users. Namely, h j,i for all j = i obtained by user i are the same as h i,j for all j = i. If all users broadcast their estimated CSI using non-overlapping payloads, then every user will know the global CSI. This could allow any subset of users to transmit to another user in a multiple-access fashion in another set of transmissions. An illustration of this idea is shown in Fig. 6 . For example, if users 1 and 2 simultaneously send x 1 of power P 1 and x 2 of power P 2 to user 3, then user 3 can receive the information from them at the rate given by log 2 (1 + |h 1,3 | 2 P 1 + |h 2,3 | 2 P 2 ) [29] . Ideally, the users could also share each other's received signals secretively to form virtual MIMO among them. But this could require excessive overheads due to relatively long pilots required for ANECE. But if all channels stay static after the initial ANECE, and the users can receive each other's information without further use of pilots, then the above is a feasible notion. Naturally, this is under the assumption that Eve cannot perform its channel estimation without receiving a pilot-driven signal.
Shown in Appendix E is an extension of the above channel estimation idea to the MIMO case. Shown in Appendix F is a broadband OFDM-based MIMO channel estimation method against eavesdropping.
In practice, users cannot rely on full-duplex for all transmissions. For example, in order to initiate the proposed ANECE, users may need to communicate with each other to set up the time for channel estimation. 3 If users do not change to a new frequency or new antenna positions (including possibly antenna orientations and polarizations) before they start the ANECE, the packets they sent previously (which typically contain pilots) could be used by Eve for channel estimation. So, users must do something to alter the CSI of Eves before they transmit packets simultaneously for ANECE. If one also needs to prevent Eves from finding their large-scale fading with respect to the users, the users (such as drones) must also move to new locations before the ANECE is conducted at a pre-agreed time. Of course, such a requirement will have an impact on the scope of possible applications.
As shown earlier, no Eve is able to identify its CSI with respect to all users when the users apply the ANECE. But if an Eve is much closer to a user than to all other users, the Eve may be able to approximately identify its CSI with respect to this user and hence may succeed in eavesdropping this user. Furthermore, if an Eve is much closer to a subset of users than to all other users, then the Eve may succeed in eavesdropping this subset of users. In order to avoid this situation, the distribution of the users should be such that the ratio of the maximum and minimum distances (or max-min ratio) between the users is below some pre-specified value. For a given number of points in 2D space, the minimum achievable max-min ratio is studied in [34] . For example, for 30 points in 2D space, the currently known minimum max-min ratio is 5.18. This ratio is generally small enough to prevent any Eve from being much closer to more than one users than to all other users. For a given number of points, the minimum max-min ratio in 3D space is obviously even smaller than that in 2D space. With a fixed path loss exponent, the max-min ratio can be measured in terms of the large-scale fading gains between users. With a fixed distribution of users, a process of measuring the large-scale fading gains and computing the max-min ratio is desirable before the users are selected to 3 An alternative could be that users periodically perform the ANECE.
participate in a session of the ANECE and the corresponding sharing of secret information.
Provided that the max-min ratio of the users is not too high, the only way that an Eve can succeed in eavesdropping is when the Eve is very close to one of the users. Specifically, around user i, there is a region A i within which an Eve could succeed in identifying its CSI with respect to this user and hence in stealing the secret sent by this user. And A i , and its size |A i |, are governed by the users that are the closest to user i. The closer are the nearby users around user i, the smaller is |A i |.
If some Eves are directional, the success of the ANECE requires the directional Eves to be sufficiently far away from the users so that the users appear clustered together from the perspective of any of the directional Eves. If some users are directional, then the directional users should either all face toward or all face away from any given Eve. This appears difficult to realize in practice. This paper is mainly concerned with omnidirectional users and Eves. The following property is easy to prove.
Property 14: Assume a sufficient constraint on the max-min ratio of the user distribution and the use of the proposed multiuser ANECE method. Also assume that the CSI of every Eve changes (or is previously unknown to itself) before the pilots are sent by all N users, the users send secret keys to each other with orthogonal scheduling 4 , and user i sends a secret key with the rate R i (in bits/s/Hz) to all other users over a short time interval sufficient to suppress the capacity of Eves without CSI. Then: 1) If no Eve is close enough to any of the users to be able to identify its CSI, then the rate of secrecy shared by all users (not counting the overhead of pilots) against all Eves which may try to collude is
With respect to non-colluding Eves, some of which may be close enough to some of users, the rate of secrecy shared by all users is no smaller than
With respect to any group of colluding Eves, if not every user has an Eve close enough to identify its CSI, then the secret from at least one user is safe from eavesdropping and hence the rate of secrecy shared by all users is no smaller than 1 N min i R i . 4) If Eves are distributed randomly according to the Poisson distribution with λ being the averaged number of Eves in a unit area, and A i is the only region where an Eve can steal the secret sent from user i, then the probability for the overall secrecy to be zero, subject to collusion among Eves, is the probability that there is an Eve in every A i . This probability is Π
, which goes to zero as N increases.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has provided a novel perspective of the potential of full-duplex radio for securing wireless network against passive multi-antenna Eves at unknown locations. The paper shows that if a multi-antenna Eve (or a network of colluding Eves) is allowed to know its CSI with respect to the legitimate users, the secrecy capacity of the single-antenna users could degrade rapidly as the total number of antennas on Eve increases, regardless of the quality of full-duplex radio. This detrimental phenomenon of decreasing secrecy capacity against Eve with increasing number of antennas is similar to that of all conventional setups where Eve knows its CSI, including those of multi-antenna users as in [44] - [45] . Motivated by this finding, this paper also presents a novel method for ANECE. This method allows all users to estimate their own CSI, but at the same time denies any Eve from finding their CSI with respect to any of the users subject to a mild constraint. This paper also shows that without knowing its CSI, Eve with any number of antennas can be virtually disabled over a time window. In other words, by using ANECE, the secrecy capacity between users against Eve with any number of antennas can increase without bound over such time window as the transmission power increases.
To mimic the ANECE property of full-duplex radio by using half-duplex (HD) radio, it would require one or more collaborative HD nodes to perform jamming against Eves 5 during the transmission of pilot from a HD transmitter to a HD receiver. But the unknown locations of Eves and the constraints on jamming interference to the legitimate HD receivers would make the deployment of such collaborative HD nodes highly infeasible. Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that the ANECE method shown in this paper is a ground-breaking discovery useful to drive a full development of full-duplex radio for wireless network security.
Finally, it seems useful to note that explicit channel estimation is not always necessary for users to exchange secret information. Such an example in high SNR channel environment is available in [43] . Further development of this idea with exploitation of full-duplex radio is definitely a logical direction of research. One should also address such important questions as: whether and how can other approaches including [43] challenge the ANECEbased approach against Eve (or a network of colluding Eves) with virtually unlimited number of antennas, and how can the ANECE-based approach be further understood and improved?
Let v A and v B be two N × 1 real-valued Gaussian random vectors with the distribution N (0, I), it is known from equation (22) in [26] 
has the following distribution:
where |x| < 1 (and N ≥ 2), and hence P v . = Q 2 v has the following distribution
where 0 < x < 1. Note that the first equation in the above has applied the fact that f Q v (x) is symmetric. Furthermore, it is
which is the standard Chisquared of degree one, i.e.,
and v B 2 is the standard Chi-squared of degree N , i.e.,
It follows from
which is equivalent to
(82) Comparing (76) against (82) with N = 2M − 1 yields (37).
B. Capacity of Multi-Antenna Eve Without CSI
As a generalization of (59), assume that an Eve of M E antennas receives the following signals from Alice with M A antennas: 
It follows that
From [38] , one knows that the capacity in bits/s/Hz from Alice to Eve is
where the inequality comes from the differential entropy of y, i.e., h(y) ≤ log 2 ((2πe)
M E K |R y |) as HX is likely non-Gaussian. Here, R y is the covariance matrix of y, i.e., R y = σ 2 x (I K ⊗ E{HH H }) + I M E K which follows from (85), and R y (x) is the covariance matrix of y conditional on x, i.e., R y (x) = (X 
where for the second equation, the fact |AA T + I| = |A T A + I| has been applied.
For unknown H, one can assume that MM
One can now verify the following: 1) If K = M A = 1 and the symbol from Alice has a constant modulus, then C A,E ,up = 0. , and hence one can achieve C A,B C A,E ,up . The above suggests that for Eve with unknown CSI, its capacity to receive information over a short period of time (i.e., K = M A ) can be degraded severely (if not completely) regardless of the number M E of antennas on Eve. Also note that the above analysis applies to the case where multiple or many (colluding) Eves combine their received signals to form a large antenna array. Such collusion would result in the same signal model as in (83) except that M E is increased.
For K > M A , there are still coding schemes that prevent Eve without CSI from obtaining any information. For example, if a constant modulus repetition code with any K > M A = 1 is used, C A,E can be shown to be zero.
On the other hand, if x(k) for k = 1, . . . , K are independent and K is large, then the amount of information (or ambiguity) carried by H becomes less significant compared to that carried by x(k) for k = 1, . . . , K. To suppress the capacity of Eve, K should be small in general. One may choose K = M A but some large σ 2 x to achieve a sufficient amount of secrecy. 
C. Estimation of h
is the residual self-interference noise at Alice after the cancellation of the self-interference caused by p A (k), n A is the background noise, and other notations are similarly defined. Also assume that w A is white and independent of p A (k), and w B is white and independent of p B (k). Due to mutual couplings between antennas, G A and G B are not diagonal in general.
Let us first consider y E (k) with k = 1, . . . , K, which can be rewritten into: which is however not required in this paper. (The reciprocal property is known to hold for the electro-magnetics in air. Although it may not hold for a radio transceiver, the channel gains on a transceiver can be pre-calibrated and compensated.)
Now consider the channel estimation at Alice, where both H B ,A and G A are unknowns, and w A (k) and n A (k) are independent CN (0, I). Obviously, given y A (k) and p B (k) for all k, G A is ambiguous up to a right unitary matrix. One can further simplify y A (k) as follows:
A + I being unknown covariance matrix. For any given R A , one can write
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product, h B ,A = vec{H B ,A } (stacking the columns of H B ,A vertically), andṽ A (k) is CN (0, I) .
And the MLE of h B ,A iŝ
Therefore, the (exact) joint MLE of H B ,A and R A can be computed in two steps. 
The optimal choice of the pilot matrix P B subject to unknown R A is such that P B P H B is proportional to the identity matrix, e.g., P B P H B = KI. The channel estimation algorithm carried out by Bob is symmetrical to that by Alice. The algorithm shown in Section A is a special case of the above.
E. ANECE for Multi-User MIMO Channels
Now consider N ≥ 3 users where user i has n i antennas. For channel estimation, all users send their pilots simultaneously. Let user j send √ P T p j (k) of n j × 1 with k = 1, . . . , K and j = 1, . . . , N. Then, user i receives
(99) where the notations are defined in a similar way as in the previous section. The signal received by any given Eve is
The matrix forms of the above two equations are The structure of (101) is identical to (93). Hence, the MLE method shown there can be directly used here. Now, it is only necessary to focus on the conditions required for P (i) and P. Clearly, one needs P of K × N T to be of rank less than N T so that H E of n E × N T is not identifiable from Y E . On the other hand, for any i = 1, . . . , N, one needs P (i) of (N T − n i ) × K to be of the full-column rank N T − n i so that H i of n i × (N T − n i ) can be identified from Y i . Also, the smaller is the condition number (i.e., the ratio of the largest singular value over the smallest singular value) of P (i) , the more robust is the MLE of H i against noise. This is because the covariance matrix of the MLE of vec{H i } is proportional to the conjugate of (P (i) P (i) H ) −1 . See (98). To meet the above constraints, it is proposed to construct P as follows. . Ifñ is replaced by one, then every pair of columns of P has the smallest magnitude 1 N T −1 of the normalized inner product, P has the deficient rank N T − 1, and P (i) has the full rank N T − n i and also, as shown next, the best possible condition (i.e., smallest condition number). To prove that P (i) has the smallest condition number whenñ = 1, let us consider the (N T − n i ) × (N T − n i ) matrix P (i) P (i) H which can be written as
where (e 
where the equality holds whenñ = 1.
If min i n i > 1, then there are trade-offs asñ varies from 1 to min i n i . Asñ increases, the condition number of P (i) increases (bad for users) but there are more degrees of freedoms in H E given Y E and P (bad for Eves).
F. ANECE for Multi-User Broadband MIMO Channels
If the channels between users are convolutive, then one can adopt the OFDM approach as follows. Each packet sent from a user has two regions: the pilot region for channel estimation and the payload region containing secret information. The pilot region is divided into K epoches, and the payload region is also divided into multiple epoches. 
For each c, the channel estimation problem is the same as that of (99) and (100). For each epoch of the payload region, each user encodes its information by following the conventional OFDM fashion, but the information from different users should be non-overlapping in time (or otherwise multiple-access coding is required). The conventional OFDM-based channel equalization applies here straightforwardly.
